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73 
WHAT ARE WE COMPARING IN COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE? 
PAUL H. EDELMAN∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the majority of jurisdictions in the country have moved from 
contributory negligence to comparative negligence in tort cases, judges 
commonly ask juries to assign a percentage of negligence1 to each of the 
parties involved in a negligence tort. While the practice of apportionment 
has become commonplace, the theory behind it is little understood. What 
exactly does it mean to assign percentages of negligence in a negligence 
case? The nature of the fault may be quite different for each party, making 
it quite difficult for the jury to combine them. Do the units used to 
measure the amount of negligence matter? Should the jury apportion 
negligence in some absolute way or in some relative way? None of these 
questions have obvious answers, and no scholar has addressed how juries 
should make these assessments.2  
 
 
 ∗ © Paul H. Edelman. Professor of Mathematics and Law, Vanderbilt University. I have 
profited from the comments of Mark Brandon, Lisa Bressman, Robert Cooter, John Goldberg, Michael 
Green, Chris Guthrie, Saul Levmore, Richard Nagareda, Robert Rasmussen, Margo Schlanger, 
Suzanna Sherry, Robert Thompson, and Christopher Yoo. 
 1. There are a plethora of words other than “negligence” one might use to describe what juries 
are asked to apportion in tort cases. The Restatement (Third) of Torts cites “responsibility,” “fault,” 
and “causation” as other terms that are commonly used. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 cmt. a (2000). It prefers the term “responsibility” since “[a]ssigning 
shares of ‘fault’ or ‘negligence’ can be misleading because some causes of action are not based on 
negligence or fault,” and “‘causation’ wrongly suggests that indivisible injuries jointly caused by two 
or more actors can be divided on the basis of causation.” Id. I focus only on negligence torts between 
two parties, therefore the concern expressed by the Restatement over the use of “negligence” is not 
warranted in my situation. Moreover, as will become clear in Section III, I will clarify what I mean by 
apportioning negligence in terms of shortfalls from reasonable levels of care, thus the use of the term 
negligence is not inappropriate. It is also the term most commonly used in the courts. The downside of 
using “negligence” is the possible confusion between the level of care taken and the tort itself. See 
JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW, RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS, 135 (2004). But since I 
am solely concerned with negligence torts and this analysis is based on the presumption that all the 
elements of a negligence tort have been met, there should be little cause for confusion. 
 2. Scholars have compared the efficiency of comparative negligence to other tort regimes. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 80–82 
(1987); Tai-Yeong Chung, Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 395 (1993); Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative 
Negligence, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1067 (1986); David Haddock & Christopher Curran, An Economic 
Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985); Daniel Orr, The Superiority of 
Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1991); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The 
Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (1987). But efficiency alone cannot 
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A small hypothetical will help illustrate the problem: The owner of a 
building is negligent in its asbestos abatement. He rents the building to a 
smoker who subsequently contracts lung cancer. The smoker sues the 
owner of the building for his medical costs. The building owner claims as 
a partial defense that the renter’s smoking contributed to his disease. How 
should a jury apportion negligence in this case?  
The building owner’s negligence might be quantified using the 
difference between what he spent on abatement and what an adequate 
abatement would have cost. Alternatively, the jury might use the 
percentage of the cost of an adequate abatement that was actually spent by 
the owner. Or the jury might use some other method entirely. 
It is no more obvious how to assess the smoker’s negligence. Should it 
be the number of packs smoked per day? The cost of the number of packs? 
The total cost spent on cigarettes during the renter’s lifetime? The personal 
utility that the smoker would lose if he were to quit smoking? Something 
else entirely? 
Even if the jury crosses these hurdles, its job is not over. Jury members 
next have to apportion the blame between the parties. How should they 
combine the measurements of individual negligence into a percentage of 
the total amount of negligence? What is the correct way to compare, say, 
the shortfall in the cost of abatement with the number of packs of 
cigarettes smoked in a day? How should the jury even approach these 
questions? 
The consequences of the jury’s assignment are potentially huge. In 
some states, a plaintiff who is assessed fifty percent or more of the fault is 
barred from recovery entirely. And even if the assignment does not serve 
as a complete bar, the percentages assigned are used to apportion the 
damages. In spite of the significance of the assignment, no guidance is 
given to the jury as to what to do.  
This Article begins the formal study of how juries should calculate the 
percentages of negligence they are required to provide. Based on the 
standard model of negligence from law and economics, I will provide a 
specific framework for juries to use. This framework determines fault 
assessment based on different kinds of negligence torts. I distinguish 
among the methods of apportionment by examining the incentives they 
give for the parties to exercise care. As a consequence of this analysis, I 
 
 
distinguish the alternative methods of apportionment. The issue requires separate consideration.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/2
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make specific recommendations for jury instructions in comparative 
negligence cases.3 
This Article proceeds in four parts. After a brief discussion in Section 
II of what juries are asked to do in assigning responsibility in comparative 
negligence cases, I will introduce three new concepts to analyze the nature 
of negligence cases. In Section III I classify two party negligence cases as 
being either commensurable or incommensurable, depending on whether 
the nature of the care to be taken by the two parties lies on the same or 
incomparable scales. Since a jury will be called upon to compare the levels 
of care taken and their ability to do so is radically different in the two 
cases, this distinction is an important one in comparative negligence 
regimes. 
Associated with these two different kinds of negligence cases are two 
different measures for the percentage of negligence that juries are called 
upon to produce in a comparative negligence regime. One measure, the 
percentage of absolute negligence, assesses the percentage in terms of the 
deviation from the reasonable level of care in absolute terms. The other, 
the percentage of relative negligence, assesses the percentage in terms of 
the level of reasonable care taken by the parties. The former measure 
requires a direct comparison of levels of care, while the latter does not 
require such a comparison. 
In Section IV of this Article, I introduce two different models of the 
relationship between levels of care and damages. The first, the additive 
care model, assumes that the damages are solely a function of the total 
amount of care taken, and the care taken by one party can act as a direct 
substitute for the care of the other. The second model, the multiplicative 
care model, assumes that the care taken by each party acts as an amplifier 
(or attenuator) for the other, but not as a direct substitute. By analyzing 
these models, I show that under the additive care model using the absolute 
percentage of negligence will align the assessment of negligence with the 
apportionment of damages. Similarly, in the case of the multiplicative care 
model, the relative percentage of negligence achieves the correct 
alignment of negligence and damages. 
Section V ties these three pairs of concepts together: I recommend that 
the method to assess the percentage of negligence be tailored to the nature 
of the negligence so as to correctly align the assessment of negligence 
 
 
 3. Throughout this Article, I will concentrate on negligence cases consisting of two parties: a 
plaintiff who has suffered harm and a defendant. This restriction will help simplify the exposition. 
Nevertheless, the approach I develop generalizes naturally to negligence cases with multiple 
tortfeasors. 
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with the apportionment of damages. Following a brief conclusion in 
Section VI, the paper closes with a technical appendix, establishing the 
claims made throughout the paper. 
II. THE CONTOURS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
In this section I discuss what sources are available to guide juries in 
apportioning negligence in a comparative negligence regime. I will 
consider three sources: jury instructions, the Restatement of Torts, and a 
sense of rough justice. As will become evident, each of these methods has 
its shortcomings, and none of them adequately addresses the core problem 
of how to compute negligence apportionment. 
In the forty-six states that have adopted comparative negligence,4 juries 
in negligence actions are routinely asked to assign shares of negligence to 
the parties. The percentages assigned, which must add to one hundred 
percent, are used in two ways. In states with modified comparative 
negligence, if the plaintiff is deemed responsible for fifty percent or more 
of the negligence, then she may be barred from any recovery.5 That is, the 
assignment of the percentage of negligence, in and of itself, can affect the 
disposition of the case. 
If the state follows a pure comparative fault regime, or if the 
percentage of negligence assigned to the plaintiff is less than fifty percent, 
then the assigned percentages of negligence are used to apportion the 
damages. The defendant will be responsible for the same percentage of the 
damages as they are assessed in negligence. The plaintiff’s recovery will 
be reduced by the percentage by which she was found negligent. So, if the 
damages are found to be $1,000, and the plaintiff is found to have been 
twenty-five percent negligent while the defendant is found to be seventy-
five percent negligent, then the defendant would be liable for 0.75 ×  
$1,000 = $750. 
 
 
 4. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and the District of Columbia continue to use 
contributory negligence. VICTOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.05[e][3], at 29 (4th ed. 
2002). 
 5. This is a slight oversimplification of the differences among modified negligence regimes. In 
some states, the plaintiff may be barred from recovery if his negligence is equal to or greater than that 
of the defendant. In other states, the plaintiff is barred if his negligence is strictly greater than that of 
the defendant. Schwartz cites fourteen states in the first category and twenty-one states (and the Virgin 
Islands) in the second. Oddly, he has Oklahoma listed in both. In South Dakota, the plaintiff is barred 
from recovery if his negligence “is more than slight.” Id. § 3.01, at 58. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/2
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As an example of the kind of inquiry that juries make, consider this 
verdict form that has been approved by the Supreme Court of Colorado for 
use in comparative negligence cases:6 
We, the jury, present our Answers to Questions submitted by the 
court, to which we have unanimously agreed: 
QUESTION NO.1: Was the defendant, ______________, 
negligent? (yes or no) 
ANSWER NO. 1: 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant’s negligence, if any, a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed (injuries) (damages) 
(losses)? (yes or no) 
ANSWER NO. 2: 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the plaintiff, _________, contributorily 
negligent? (yes or no) 
ANSWER NO. 3: 
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, if 
any, a proximate cause of (his) (her) claimed (injuries) (damages) 
(losses)? (yes or no) 
ANSWER NO. 4: 
QUESTION NO. 5: If you have answered all the four foregoing 
questions “yes,” then you are to answer this question: 
Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the 
(injuries) (damages) (losses) as 100 percent, what percentage of that 
negligence was attributable to the defendant and what percentage 
was attributable to the plaintiff? 
ANSWER NO. 5: 
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to defendant, 
____________: _____ % 
Percentage of combined negligence attributable to plaintiff, 
____________: _____% 
 
 
 6. Id. § 17.04[c], at 369 (citing Richard W. Laugesen, Colorado Comparative Negligence, 48 
DEN. L. J. 469, app. at 495 (1972)). For a similar special verdict form from Tennessee, see GOLDBERG 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 387. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Total: 100% 
QUESTION NO. 6: If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 “yes,” 
state the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff and 
proximately caused by the (accident) (occurrence), without regard 
to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, if any. 
ANSWER NO. 6: $_____________. 
If the answers to the first four questions are all “Yes,” the judge uses 
the remaining answers in two possible ways. First, if the percentage of 
combined negligence attributable to the plaintiff is fifty percent or greater, 
then under Colorado law the plaintiff is barred from any recovery.7 
Second, if the plaintiff is not barred from recovery, the defendant is liable 
for the percentage of damages equal to the percentage of combined 
negligence that he was apportioned in Answer No. 5. 
It is critical to note that, under these instructions, the apportionment of 
negligence is distinct from the computation of damages. The jury is meant 
to determine the apportionment of negligence without regard to the 
amount of damages in question. Thus, they are asked to work with the 
abstract ideas of negligence instead of the more concrete value of 
damages. Only after the percentage of negligence is decided are the 
damages assessed to the plaintiff, discounted by an amount equal to the 
percentage of negligence assigned to him. The jury is never required to 
determine the relationship between each individual party’s behavior and 
the amount of damage produced. 
For a somewhat different view of what juries should do in a 
comparative negligence case, consider the discussion of assigning shares 
of responsibility in section eight of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Apportionment of Liability: 
§ 8. Factors for Assigning Shares of Responsibility 
Factors for assigning percentages of responsibility to each person 
whose legal responsibility has been established include 
(a) the nature of the person’s risk-creating conduct, including any 
awareness or indifference with respect to the risk created by the 
conduct and any intent with respect to the harm created by the 
conduct; and 
 
 
 7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(3) (2005). As noted earlier, some states bar recovery only if 
the percentage strictly exceeds fifty percent. See supra note 3.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/2
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(b) the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-
creating conduct and the harm. 8 
Part (a) of this two-prong assessment is quite compatible with the previous 
discussion of what juries should do. It is focused solely on the behaviors 
of the parties without respect to any relationship between those actions and 
the damages generated.  
Part (b), on the other hand, is quite different. It focuses on the 
connection between the behavior of the party and the harm. The term 
“strength” is left undefined,9 but it would seem to be a more refined 
measure of causation than proximate cause, since the proximate cause 
threshold has already been crossed. It also focuses on “the harm” rather 
than the accident, suggesting the jury should be concerned with the 
amount of harm each party generated rather than their contribution to the 
negligence itself. 
The notion that the percentage of negligence should reflect the amount 
of harm each party’s actions generated is intuitive and just, but it presents 
troubling questions. In comparative negligence, it is necessarily true that 
both parties’ actions led to the harm. At the same time, it is impossible to 
isolate exactly which actions caused which damages. As noted in the 
Restatement, “[a]ssigning shares of ‘causation’ wrongly suggests that 
indivisible injuries jointly caused by two or more actors can be divided on 
the basis of causation.”10 
A second-best solution harnesses the economic incentives that the tort 
system provides to the parties.11 More specifically, the tort system 
provides incentives for the parties to take an optimal level of care, and it 
makes possible the assignment of responsibility on this basis. Rather than 
look to the actual damages generated by each party, if such an inquiry is 
even possible, we might instead ask how the level of care chosen by each 
party increased the expected damages from an accident. For example, one 
might know what the increase in expected damages in a car accident is as a 
function of speed. Then, in a traffic accident case, one might be able to 
specify the percentage of the expected damages generated by a speeding 
automobile. Potentially, this percentage could be used to allocate the 
 
 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 8. 
 9. Comment (c) helpfully remarks that “[t]he comparative strength of the causal connection 
between the conduct and the harm depends on how attenuated the causal connection is, the timing of 
each person’s conduct in causing the harm, and a comparison of the risks created by the conduct and 
the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Id.  
 10. Id. at § 8 cmt. a. 
 11. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (6th ed. 2003). 
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actual damages. One might think that it is no easier to allocate actual 
damages based on an apportionment of expected damages than it is to deal 
with the actual damages in the first place. But, as I will subsequently 
show, the move to expected damages simplifies the question considerably. 
None of this is to say that juries actually make their decisions in 
accordance with any of these frameworks. They might ignore whatever 
question is put to them and simply produce a rough justice that is driven 
by a desired outcome. They might adjust the apportionment of negligence 
to distribute the damages in an equitable manner, adjust the damages so as 
to guarantee a certain payout to the defendant, or some combination of 
these strategies. While one cannot guarantee that juries will be controlled 
by the questions that are asked or even fully understand what those 
questions are, it is not unreasonable to think that the questions posed will 
frame their inquiry and influence their deliberations. Moreover, if the 
questions that are posed to them are indeterminate, ill-posed, or poorly 
phrased, then there is little or no chance that the jury will feel constrained 
to respond only to them.  
III. APPORTIONING NEGLIGENCE 
In this section I develop the formal framework for how to apportion 
negligence. It consists of three sub-sections. The first confronts the 
problem of comparing the negligence of the parties when the nature of the 
care to be taken is vastly different for each. The second subsection 
describes the formal model, adapted from a classical law and economics 
approach to torts. Using this model, I introduce two distinct methods of 
apportioning negligence. In the last subsection, I describe how these 
methods are applied in different circumstances. 
A. Commensurable and Incommensurable Care 
Consider the following two negligence hypotheticals:  
Hypothetical I: Driver A is speeding down a road at fifty miles per 
hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone. Driver B, going in the opposite 
direction down the same road, makes a left-hand turn in front of A without 
signaling. The two cars collide. Driver B sues A for negligence, and A 
claims that B was at fault as well.  
Hypothetical II: The owner of a building does a negligent job of 
asbestos abatement. He rents the building to a smoker, who subsequently 
contracts lung cancer. The smoker sues the owner of the building for his 
medical costs. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss1/2
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If these cases were to be tried, the juries would most likely have to 
decide on the relative levels of negligence for each of the parties. Yet, the 
inquiry is different in these two hypotheticals. In the first hypothetical, the 
nature of the care to be taken is the same for the two parties: drive safely. 
Juries might sensibly compare the care taken by each of the drivers 
because, at least conceptually, a single scale applies to both.12  
By contrast, the second hypothetical presents the jury with the 
challenge of comparing apples to oranges. The nature of the care to be 
taken by the owner of the building is with respect to proper asbestos 
abatement procedures. The nature of the care to be taken by the lessee is 
with respect to leading a healthy life. How is a jury to measure one against 
the other in anything but an ad hoc way? The types of care fall on 
different, incommensurable scales, making a direct comparison 
impossible. Indeed, any comparison a jury purports to make is simply ad 
hoc. 
The challenge is to disaggregate the two types of torts and create fault 
assessment methods for each. I will call a negligence tort in which the care 
taken by the parties lies on a common scale a commensurable tort and one 
for which the types of care lie on different scales an incommensurable tort. 
This use of the term commensurable is consistent with some, although not 
all, of its uses in legal academia.13 Whether a negligence tort is 
commensurable or incommensurable depends, to some extent, on the 
specificity of the nature of care at issue. For example, all negligence torts 
would be commensurable if we were to specify the nature of care as 
“being careful.” On the other hand, my first hypothetical could be 
characterized as incommensurable if the nature of the care of driver A is 
described as “don’t go too fast” and that of B is “don’t turn without 
signaling.” Nevertheless, this distinction will help focus attention on the 
problems the jury confronts in deciding comparative negligence.14 Note 
that I am not asserting that the parties’ behavior cannot be compared in an 
incommensurable tort. Rather, I am claiming that they cannot be compared 
 
 
 12. It is interesting to note that in the Restatement, all the illustrations of assigning fault involve 
car accidents, thus keeping the inquiry as simple as possible. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 
1, § 8 cmts. b, c, illus. 1–7. 
 13. In particular, it is consistent with Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1 (Ruth Chang, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1997). For 
further discussion of other legal uses of the term, see Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: 
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998). 
 14. The difficulty facing juries in incommensurable torts has been noted before. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 8 reporter’s note to cmt. a. 
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in the same straightforward way as in commensurable torts. More work is 
necessary.15  
Allowing for incommensurable scales of care may seem jarring in a 
paper that adopts a law and economics framework. Indeed, whether there 
is such a thing as incommensurability is the subject of considerable 
debate.16 The typical law and economics approach would be to monetize 
care, thus making all torts commensurable. This is certainly appropriate 
for torts where the nature of negligence is an inadequate investment in 
care, e.g., not fencing a swimming pool or not providing a life guard. In 
those cases, it makes sense to identify the shortfall in negligence with the 
cost of providing due care. 
However, the assumption that one can always monetize the level of 
care is problematic for three reasons: it may be very unclear how to 
monetize the care, the monetization may not capture the level of 
negligence, and juries, who are asked determine the apportionment of 
negligence, may not view negligence in this fashion.  
Consider the following hypothetical: A joyriding teenager decides that 
it would be fun to try and drive blindfolded. Needless to say, an accident 
ensues. How should we monetize the teenager’s negligence? Does it equal 
the value of the blindfold, or the amount of money that would persuade 
him not to drive blindfolded? Would either of these amounts (or any other 
plausible valuation) come close to capturing our intuitive sense of the 
extent of the teenager’s negligence? Would any such amount be plausible 
to a jury? It seems clear that monetization in this situation is just not a 
viable way to proceed.17 
B. Absolute and Relative Negligence 
I now proceed to the formal description of how to apportion 
negligence. I develop two different methods. The first is applicable only to 
commensurable torts, but the second can be applied to either 
commensurable or incommensurable torts. 
 
 
 15. This is the distinction between incommensurability (the lack of a common scale) and 
incomparability (the inability to compare two things). Certainly incomparability implies 
incommensurability, but the converse need not be true. For further discussion of this distinction, see 
Chang, supra note 13, at 4–7. 
 16. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 13; Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1169 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 
(1994). 
 17. It is worth noting that most of the rest of the paper is not dependent on rejecting the idea that 
care can always be monetized. Most of the concepts and distinctions will apply even if one believes 
that all torts are commensurable. 
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For commensurable torts, the percentage of negligence for each of the 
parties has a natural definition. Because the tort is commensurable, there is 
some scale of care on which we can plot the amount of care taken by the 
parties and the reasonable level of care required to avoid negligence 
(which, in principle, might be different for each of the parties). That is, let 
the level of reasonable care be denoted by x* and y* for the two parties A 
and B, respectively, and let their chosen levels of care be x′ and y′.18 If 
both parties are negligent then x′ < x*, and y′ < y*. Let ∆x be the 
difference between the level of reasonable care and the chosen level, i.e., 
∆x = x* – x′, and similarly for ∆y. Then the total amount of negligence is 
given by ( ) ( ) yxyyxx Δ+Δ=−+− '*'* . 
The percentage of the total negligence due to party A is  
yx
x
Δ+Δ
Δ , 
and the amount due to B is  
yx
y
Δ+Δ
Δ . 
The task of assigning percentages of negligence, in the commensurable 
case, can be accomplished by working with the absolute deviations from 
reasonable care. I will refer to these as the percentages of absolute 
negligence. This definition of the percentage of negligence has been 
considered previously by Cooter and Ulen.19 
It is worth noting that the percentages of absolute negligence can be 
computed solely from information on the relative size of the negligence. 
That is, if A is deemed to be twice as negligent as B, then we can conclude 
that ∆x = 2∆y, and hence the percentage of absolute negligence of A is 
two-thirds and that of B is one-third. If the tort is commensurable, then the 
 
 
 18. I am assuming here, and throughout the rest of the Article, that care is usefully modeled as a 
continuous variable. This assumption is not necessary in this section, but it will be in the next. If care 
is truly binary (either one is careful or one isn’t), then the analysis in this paper is inappropriate, since 
it would be impossible in any meaningful sense to quantify the amount of negligence. I believe that in 
the vast majority of situations, however, there is a gradation of care, and that is sufficient for my 
needs. 
 19. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1103. Cooter and Ulen initially adopt this method of 
assigning percentages of negligence. However, they immediately reject it as “not, however, the best 
representation of the law.” Id. They then argue that “a good measure of the contribution is the relative 
increase in expected accident losses due to each party’s negligence.” Id. Thus, they explicitly identify 
the percentage of negligence with the percentage of expected costs associated with their level of care. 
Since the purpose of this paper is to unpack the relationship between percent negligence and percent 
damages, I will not be as quick to dismiss this formulation as they were. 
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inquiry into the relative size of the negligence is a coherent question to ask 
a jury.20 
For incommensurable torts, the calculation of absolute percentages is 
not possible. The definitions of ∆x and ∆y still make sense, because each 
difference is computed with respect to only one scale, but the 
incommensurability of the two scales means that the sum  ∆x + ∆y has no 
real meaning. How, then, should we go about relating the two standards of 
care? 
To do this, we can work with percentages of reasonable care rather 
than the amount of care itself.21 That is, we can measure the relative 
amount of care of A by the value ∆x/x* and the relative amount of care of 
B by ∆y/y*. These values are dimensionless; they measure the percentage 
of reasonable care each party took, but it is no longer in terms of particular 
scales of care. Thus, we can sensibly add these numbers to find the total 
negligence 
**
**
** yx
yxxy
y
y
x
x Δ+Δ=Δ+Δ .22 
The percentage of this negligence attributable to A is 
yxxy
xy
yx
yxxy
x
x
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ+Δ
Δ
**
*
**
**
* , 
and that attributable to B is 
yxxy
yx
yx
yxxy
y
y
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ+Δ
Δ
**
*
**
**
* . 
I will refer to these measures as the percentages of relative negligence. 
 
 
 20. This is not strictly true as it depends on the nature of the scale and not just on the existence of 
a scale. Suppose we measure two objects and one has the temperature 35°C and the other is 70°C. We 
might be tempted to say that the second object is twice as hot as the first. But if temperature is 
measured in Fahrenheit, then the temperatures would be 85° F and 158° F, respectively, and the 
second object is not twice as hot. So, the claim that one object is twice as hot as the other is contingent 
on the scale itself and not on the existence of a scale. For further details on meaningful and 
meaningless statements about measurements see Fred S. Roberts, Measurement Theory, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 71 (G. Rota ed., 1979). 
 21. This is not unlike the economist’s use of price elasticity of demand, rather than the slope of 
the demand curve, as a way to circumvent the choice of units. 
 22. While adding incommensurable values is of dubious validity, there is no such problem with 
taking products as is done in this calculation. For a more familiar example, the unit of momentum is 
mass times velocity.  
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The choice of relative percentages has the additional benefit of giving 
the same outcome independent of the scale used for negligence.23 As an 
illustration, suppose two people were asked to compute the percentage of 
the speed limit a car was traveling. It would not matter if the speed (and 
the limit) was measured in terms of miles per hour, kilometers per hour, or 
furlongs per fortnight, the answer would be the same. So, to this extent, 
even if jurors disagree on the scale of care they may get the same answer 
for the percentage of reasonable care taken.  
It is important to note that, even though incommensurable torts 
necessitated the definition of percentages of relative negligence, the 
definition makes sense for commensurable torts as well. Thus, percentages 
of relative negligence give an alternative method for apportioning 
negligence to that of absolute negligence in the case of commensurable 
torts. I will return later to the question of which method should be applied 
when either can be used. 
The percentage of relative negligence attributable to A is governed by 
the product of the absolute negligence of A with the level of reasonable 
care for B (algebraically, y*∆x). That is, small absolute amounts of 
negligence by A are amplified by the level of care that B should 
reasonably take. What is the intuition behind this? The fact that B’s 
reasonable standard of care (y*) is quite high would imply there is a large 
risk of damage inherent in the situation. This implies that minimally 
negligent behavior by A could lead to an overall large drop in the total 
level of care. 
Consider the following hypothetical: An independent contractor, A, is 
hired to do a hazardous job at a factory owned by B. As part of the 
contract, B is to provide a protective suit to A. Suppose B provides a suit 
that is somewhat substandard, but A does not button it securely. While 
completing the job, there is an accident that results in serious injury to A. 
Had A buttoned the suit securely he might have been harmed to some 
degree, but not nearly as much. 
The level of negligence of A, measured in absolute terms, is not very 
large. Surely everyone has failed to button a piece of clothing securely at 
one time or another. But because he was in a particularly risky situation, 
indicated by the fact that B’s reasonable level of care was high, the relative 
negligence on the part of A is quite substantial.24 
 
 
 23. More precisely, the outcome is independent of any multiplicative change of scale. 
 24. Not coincidentally, the damages were mostly due to A as well. 
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C. Applying the Measures 
While the absolute percentages of negligence are inapplicable to 
incommensurable torts, the relative percentages are applicable to all 
negligence torts. When do the two measures coincide? They will agree 
when x* = y*. That is, if the levels of reasonable care are identical then the 
absolute percentages of negligence are the same as the relative 
percentages. The larger the gap between the reasonable levels of care, the 
greater the difference between the two measures becomes. 
To further illustrate the situation in which the choice of the two 
measures matters, consider the following hypothetical: Homeowner, A, 
leaves a loaded gun, with the safety off, on the kitchen table. Her invited 
guest, B, sees the gun and, assuming it is unloaded, proceeds to practice 
his “quick-draw,” resulting in him accidentally shooting himself in the 
foot.  
If we view this as a commensurable tort, where the scale of care is 
“taking care with firearms,” then clearly both parties have been negligent. 
We might continue to observe that the level of reasonable care for A, the 
homeowner, should be considerably higher than that of B, the visitor. The 
homeowner has a duty to keep obviously dangerous items away from her 
guests. We would expect a gun owner to take more precautions with her 
weapon in anticipation of visitors. The guest was clearly negligent for 
playing with a gun, but his level of reasonable care would seem to be 
lower than that expected of A. 
Because this example involves a commensurable tort, either the 
absolute or relative percentages of negligence could be used to establish 
comparative negligence. Yet the levels of reasonable care are so different 
that these measures are likely to produce vastly different values. How 
should we choose between the two measures? 
One thing we might ask is which of these two methods gives the 
appropriate incentives to the parties to take due care. Unfortunately, that 
inquiry will not be dispositive. As Cooter and Ulen show,25 both of these 
methods provide efficient incentives when the parties are fully informed.26 
If efficiency concerns will not help choose, perhaps equity concerns 
will. As discussed in Section II, one desirable characteristic of an 
allocation of negligence is that the allocation apportions the damages to 
the parties in relation to the extent their actions produced an increase in the 
 
 
 25. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2. 
 26. This follows from minimal alterations in the analysis in the Mathematical Appendix (B). See 
id. at 1104. 
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expected damages. We can choose between the two methods of 
apportioning negligence by seeing which method does a better job meeting 
this goal. To do this, I will introduce two different models describing the 
relationship between levels of care and expected damages. 
IV. ADDITIVE AND MULTIPLICATIVE CARE 
In the previous section, I introduced two methods of assigning 
percentages of negligence based on the levels of care of the participants. 
One of the methods applies only to commensurable torts, while the other 
applies to both commensurable and incommensurable torts. In this section, 
I will investigate when these percentages of negligence are consistent with 
the percentages of expected damages generated by the two parties’ actions. 
In order to make the connection between responsibility and expected 
damages, I will need a model of how levels of care translate into expected 
damages. A common model is to assume that there is a function D(x,y) 
that describes the expected damages given the levels of care.27 Typically 
one would assume as little as possible about the nature of the function 
D(x,y); the only commonly enforced requirements concern the behavior of 
the partial derivatives.28 For my inquiry, however, it is necessary to 
specify more completely the function D(x,y).  
I will focus on two special cases for how the function D(x,y) behaves. 
The first case is where D(x,y) = q(x + y) for some function q. That is, the 
expected damages due to the choices regarding levels of care are 
dependent on the sum of the individual levels of care. I will refer to this 
situation as additive care. In additive care, the care taken by one party can 
act as a substitute for the care taken by the other. So, for example, in the 
case of car accidents (for instance, Hypothetical I from the previous 
section) additional care by one car could compensate for the lack of care 
by the other. In Hypothetical I, if the speeding car had been going slower 
or the turning car had waited until the speeding car had passed, the 
accident could have been avoided. The additive care model seems most 
applicable to commensurable torts, since it assumes that one party’s care is 
directly substitutable (in a one-to-one relationship) by the other’s. 
The second special case of significance is when D(x,y) = p(xy) for 
some function p. In this model, the expected damages are a function of the 
product of the levels of care. I will refer to this situation as multiplicative 
care. In multiplicative care, each party’s care does not act as a substitute 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 183 (2004). 
 28. Id. 
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for the other, but rather as a magnifier of it. So, for instance, in 
Hypothetical II from the previous section, the remaining asbestos in the 
building compounded the effect of the smoking by the lessee but 
additional care by the lessor could not act as a substitute for it.29 That is, 
the lessor could not act to lower the risk inherent in the lessee’s smoking.30 
The multiplicative care model can be applied to either commensurable 
or incommensurable torts, but there would seem to be a particular affinity 
to incommensurable torts. If the levels of care are incommensurable, they 
are less likely to act as substitutes as opposed to amplifying factors. From 
a more formal perspective, by taking a product of the levels of care one 
need not worry that the units of care are not the same for each of the 
parties. 
Both of these prototypical models of the relationship between care and 
the expected damages satisfy the minimum requirements for such 
functions,  but their behaviors are really quite different. The differences 
have implications for the relationship between negligence and damages, as 
well as for classical questions about the “least cost avoider.”31  
The advantage of using this formal model is that it allows us, as a 
mathematical matter, to separate the contribution to the expected damages 
that each party makes by his actions. Suppose, as before, that party A 
takes a level of care x′ and her level of reasonable care is x*. Similarly, B’s 
chosen level of care is y′, his reasonable level of care is y*, and the 
function that describes the expected damages in terms of the level of care 
is D(x,y). Thus, the expected damages produced by the combined actions 
of A and B are D(x′,y′), whereas if they each had chosen reasonable levels 
of care one would expect damages amounting to D(x*,y*).  
Can we say anything meaningful about how much of the additional 
expected damages are due to the behavior of each party separately? 
Suppose that A had chosen the reasonable level of care x*, but B had 
chosen the substandard level y′. Then certainly B would be responsible for 
the additional expected damages D(x*,y′) – D(x*,y*) produced by his 
actions. Similarly, were B to have behaved reasonably (choosing y*) and 
 
 
 29. Smoking and exposure to asbestos do, in fact, interact multiplicatively in the causing of lung 
cancer. See P. N. Lee, Relation Between Exposure to Asbestos and Smoking Jointly and the Risk of 
Lung Cancer, 58 OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED. 145 (2001).  
 30. Daniel Farber has noted via e-mail that the distinction between additive and multiplicative 
care is less clean that it might first appear. By making an exponential change in variables, one can 
change additive care in to multiplicative care, or vice versa. That is, if we let v = ln x and u = ln y, then 
p(xy)= p(eveu)= p(eu+v)= q(u + v). Thus, what is multiplicative care in the variables x and y is additive 
care in the variables u and v. E-mail from Daniel Farber to author (Sept. 9, 2006) (on file with author). 
 31. See SHAVELL, supra note 27, § 2.11. 
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A behaved unreasonably (choosing x′) then A would be liable for the 
additional expected damages D(x′,y*) – D(x*,y*). A fundamental theorem 
of several-variable calculus states that, under suitable conditions, the sum 
of these two individual contributions is a good approximation for the total 
increase in the expected damages.32 Moreover, one can estimate the 
percentage of each of the individual contributions without knowing very 
much about the functions themselves. Some examples will help clarify 
many of these ideas. 
Example 1: Additive Care.  
Suppose that the expected damages due to an accident are given by the 
formula 
yx
yxD +=
1000),( , 
where x and y are the levels of care taken by the two parties, A, and B, 
respectively. Suppose that the levels of reasonable care are given by x* = 
100 and y* = 200, and that the chosen levels of care are x′ = 99 and y′ = 
199. The additional expected damages generated by the choice of less-
than-reasonable care is 
0224.03333.33557.3
300
1000
298
1000)200,100()199,99( =−=−=−=Δ DDD . 
The power of the formalism I have developed will now become 
evident. Using the differential approximation from several-variable 
calculus, one can identify how much of the additional expected damages 
are attributable to each of the parties. If x′ and y′ are close to x* and y*, 
then the contribution due to A is approximated by 
0111.01)0111.0()99100(
300
1000)'*(
*)*(
1000
22 =×=−=−+ xxyx , 
and similarly the contribution due to B is given by 
0111.01)0111.0()199200(
300
1000)'*(
*)*(
1000
22 =×=−=−+ yyyx .
33 
This differential approximation accounts for almost all of the additional 
expected damages: 
( ) ( ) 0222.0)1)(0111.0()1)(0111.0()199200(300
1000)99100(
300
1000
22 =+=−+−≈ΔD , 
 
 
 32. THOMAS H. BARR, VECTOR CALCULUS 195 (2d ed., 2001). 
 33. This is just an application of the standard differential approximation from several variable 
calculus as discussed by Barr. See id. See also Appendix, infra Section VII, for the general statement. 
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where the first term in the sum corresponds to the contribution due to A’s 
negligence and the second term corresponds to B. This is not a perfect 
equality (although, in this instance, it is good to three decimal places), but 
it will be close as long as the chosen level of care is not too far from the 
reasonable level of care. 
One might reasonably ask about situations in which the levels of care 
chosen are sufficiently far from the established reasonable levels so as to 
render the differential approximation useless. The standard law and 
economics response is that, under the usual hypotheses, perfect 
information will result in the parties choosing reasonable care, so that it is 
only under uncertainty that either party will act negligently.34 If that is the 
case, it is reasonable to assume the uncertainty will result in only small 
deviations from the level of reasonable care, and so the differential 
approximation should be accurate. Conversely, the choice of a level of 
care far from the reasonable one might well be considered evidence of 
wanton disregard or deliberate indifference, which would allow for 
punitive damages. The addition of punitive damages could account for the 
difference between the differential approximation and the actual amount of 
expected damages generated. 
In Example 1, the two parties play an equal part in generating the 
additional expected damage. Which of the two negligence apportionments 
agrees with this? The absolute percentages for A are  
2
1  1
1
1 y =+=Δ+Δ
Δ
x
x  
and, similarly, 1/2 for B. That is, the absolute percentages are exactly 
what we want. 
By contrast, if relative percentages were used A would be assigned 
3
2
21001200
1200
**
* =×+×
×=Δ+Δ
Δ
yxxy
xy , 
and B would be assigned the remaining 1/3. Thus, in this circumstance, the 
absolute percentage is the better method to use for assigning comparative 
negligence. 
Example 2: Multiplicative Care.  
Consider a different function describing expected damages: 
xy
yxD 1000),( = . 
 
 
 34. Cooter & Ulen supra note 2, § 2(B). 
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If we choose the same values for reasonable care and chosen level of care 
as in Example 1, then the additional expected damage generated by the 
negligence is 
0076.005000.005076.0
200100
1000
19999
1000)200,100()199,99( =−=×−×=−=Δ DDD . 
As before, we can decompose the additional expected damage into its two 
constituent parts: 
00075.000025.00005.0)199200(
200100
1000)99100(
200100
1000
22 =+=−××+−××≈ΔD
 
where the first term in the sum corresponds to the portion contributed by A 
and the second is that contributed by B. In this case, the additional 
expected damages generated by A’s conduct are twice that of B’s.  
Because the values for reasonable care and chosen level of care are the 
same in this example as in Example 1, the absolute and relative 
percentages are the same as the ones we previously computed.35 As 
demonstrated in Example 1, the absolute percentages give rise to an even 
split of the negligence. The relative percentages, however, are split two-
thirds for A and one-third for B. Thus, in this example, the relative 
percentages give the better answer for assigning comparative negligence. 
What do these two examples show us about when it is appropriate to 
use absolute percentages and when to use relative percentages? Example 1 
illustrates additive care, where the expected damages are solely a function 
of the sum of the levels of care, and one party’s care can act as a substitute 
for the other. In this example, the absolute percentages of negligence 
allocate the damages in the proportions by which the expected damages 
were generated. It is always the case that, in situations of additive care, the 
choice of the absolute percentages of negligence allocates the damages in 
the proportions by which the expected damages were generated by each 
party.36 
Example 2 illustrates multiplicative care, i.e., the expected damages are 
solely dependent on the product of the levels of care. In multiplicative 
care, the levels of care of each party act, not as a substitute for the other, 
but rather as an amplifying factor. The example illustrates what is true in 
general: for situations of multiplicative care, the choice of relative 
 
 
 35. The measures of percentage responsibility are computed solely in terms of the chosen level 
of care and the established level of reasonable care. One need not know anything about the function 
that relates levels of care to damages in order to make the calculation. See supra Section III for details. 
 36. See infra Section VII (Technical Appendix, Proposition 1). 
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percentages of negligence will allocate damages to each party in the 
proportions by which the expected damages are generated.37  
Thus, there are reasons to make both methods of apportioning 
negligence available. The method of absolute percentages is superior to 
the method of relative percentages when the tort is best described by 
additive care. The reverse is true if the tort is best described by 
multiplicative care.  
V. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FACTORS 
In the two previous sections I have introduced three pairs of concepts: 
commensurable and incommensurable torts, absolute and relative 
percentages of negligence, and additive and multiplicative care. In this 
section, I will tie these ideas together to provide a framework that courts 
and juries can use to analyze comparative negligence cases. 
The most rigorous and precise connection is between the methods of 
apportioning negligence and the nature of the connection between care and 
damages. When care is additive, using absolute percentages of negligence 
will apportion the damages in the proportions by which the expected 
damages are generated. When care is multiplicative, relative percentages 
of negligence will similarly apportion the damages.  
The connection between these two concepts and the remaining pair, 
commensurable/incommensurable torts, is necessarily less precise and 
more intuitive. If the tort is commensurable, when the nature of the care of 
each party is the same, either the absolute or relative percentages of 
negligence can be applied. The calculation of the absolute percentages 
relies on being able to add the levels of care, and hence it is necessary that 
the levels of care be commensurable. However, one could just as well 
compute the relative percentages of negligence if the tort is 
commensurable. 
If the tort is incommensurable, however, it is not possible to compute 
the absolute percentages of negligence. Instead, one must employ the 
relative percentages. By working with relative percentages, we can avoid 
comparing the levels of care directly and instead work with dimension-free 
quantities. In situations where the levels of care of the parties cannot 
meaningfully be compared, there is little else that one can do. 
And what of the relationship between commensurable/ 
incommensurable and additive/multiplicative models? This is the most 
 
 
 37. See infra Section VII (Technical Appendix, Proposition 2). 
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speculative of the connections. Additive care can only adhere in situations 
for which the care of one party can completely substitute, in a one-for-one 
manner, for the care of the other.38 This would suggest that the nature of 
the tort is commensurable since the types of care themselves are 
substitutable. However, it need not logically follow that all 
commensurable torts are best modeled by additive care.39 
If the tort is incommensurable, then the nature of the care of each party 
is incomparable. My intuition is that incomparable kinds of care cannot 
substitute for each other as in additive care, but are more likely to act as 
amplifiers (or attenuators) for each other. That is, incommensurable torts 
are likely to be best modeled by multiplicative care. 
What are the implications of this for judges and juries? It suggests that, 
in comparative negligence cases, the instructions to the jury on how to 
compute the percentage of negligence should depend on the type of 
negligence tort in question. If the tort is commensurable and the nature of 
the care is additive, then the jury should be instructed to assess the 
percentage of negligence in absolute terms, i.e., how far was the party 
from taking reasonable care? If the tort is incommensurable or if the nature 
of care is multiplicative, then the jury should be asked to compute the 
percentage of negligence in relative terms, i.e., what percentage of 
reasonable care did each party take? By adjusting the calculation for the 
percentage of negligence depending on the nature of the tort and/or the 
nature of the care, we can allow the jury to make a coherent judgment and 
align the proportion of negligence with the proportion of damages that the 
parties might have expected to generate by their actions. 
To be specific, if the tort is incommensurable or the nature of the care 
is multiplicative, the Colorado special verdict form40 might be altered in 
the following way to reflect it: 
QUESTION NO. 5: If you answered all the four foregoing 
questions “yes,” then you are to answer the next two questions. 
Note that the percentages requested need not add to 100%: 
a) What percentage of reasonable care did the defendant take? As an 
example, 50% would indicate that the defendant took half as much 
care as he should have. 
 
 
 38. By one-for-one I mean that a decrease of one unit of care by one party can be compensated 
for by an increase of one unit of care by the other. 
 39. Although, at the moment, I am unable to provide a convincing example of a commensurable 
tort exhibiting multiplicative care. 
 40. Supra text accompanying note 6. 
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ANSWER NO. 5 a): The percentage of reasonable care taken by 
defendant ______: ___%. 
b) What percentage of reasonable care did the plaintiff take? As an 
example, 50% would indicate that the plaintiff took half as much 
care as he should have. 
ANSWER NO. 5 b): The percentage of reasonable care taken by 
defendant ______: ___%. 
From the answers to these two questions, the judge can compute the 
relative percentages of negligence and then assess damages.41 If the jury is 
to be informed of the implications of its assignments for barring recovery, 
the form should include some statement like, “If the percentage assigned 
in ANSWER NO. 5 a) is smaller than that in ANSWER NO. 5 b) then the 
plaintiff will be barred from recovery of damages.” 
As an example of how this inquiry into relative percentages of 
negligence might lead to a significantly different outcome from the 
absolute percentages, consider Hypothetical II from Section III.42 Suppose 
it would cost the owner $1,000,000 to abate the asbestos in his building, 
but he negligently performs the task at a cost of only $900,000. Suppose 
the lessee smokes two packs of cigarettes per day and the level of non-
negligent behavior, with regard to smoking, is only one pack per day. In 
addition, suppose the measure of negligence for the owner is the money 
spent on abatement, and the measure of negligence for the smoker is the 
inverse of the number of packs per day smoked.43 
What is the apportionment of responsibility under absolute 
percentages? The negligence on the part of the smoker is one pack per day 
and that of the building owner is $100,000. How a jury would proceed 
from here is difficult to say, but $100,000 is a lot of money relative to an 
extra pack a day habit. They might easily find the building owner has the 
preponderance of the responsibility here. 
As was noted earlier,44 smoking and exposure to asbestos interact in a 
multiplicative fashion to produce lung cancer, and so the computation of 
 
 
 41. I have phrased these questions in terms of percentage of reasonable care because I think that 
is easier to describe and somewhat more intuitive. The relative percentages of negligence would be 
obtained by subtracting these numbers from 100. 
 42. For an informative discussion of practical issues in apportioning negligence in cases such as 
this, see Michael Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment, CONN. INS. L. J. (forthcoming 2007) 
(on file with author). 
 43. So reasonable care for the smoker is 1 / 1 = 1 and this particular smoker is exercising the 
level of 1 / 2 = 0.5. The choice of units is, of course, arbitrary. 
 44. See Lee, supra note 29. 
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relative percentages of negligence would be more appropriate. The owner 
was ten percent negligent,45 and the smoker was fifty percent negligent.46 
Thus, the percentages of relative responsibility are about sixteen percent 
for the owner and eighty-four percent for the smoker.47 
Of course, this proposed modification will put added responsibility on 
the judge to decide which of the methods of assessing percentage 
responsibility applies. But jury instructions are often the subject of 
controversy in tort actions, and one would expect that the courts will adopt 
general guidelines quickly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the United States, juries are routinely asked to apportion 
negligence among plaintiffs and defendants. Yet juries are given very 
little, if any, guidance on how to proceed. This Article demonstrates that 
there are at least two conceptually distinct ways of apportioning 
negligence and that they provide different incentives to take care. Whether 
those incentives are in alignment with the expected damages the parties 
produce based on their choice of care depends on the nature of the tort. 
Different torts may require different apportionments to correctly align the 
damages. 
I hope that the framework developed in this paper will foster further 
inquiry into the workings of comparative negligence. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this regime are much more subtle than they first appear. 
A careful parsing of the questions (and answers) is sorely needed. 
VII. TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
In this appendix, I adapt the basic law and economics framework for 
the study of negligence to analyze the assignment of damages under a 
comparative negligence regime. The traditional use of this framework is 
not to study damages, but rather to investigate the relative efficiencies of 
comparative negligence to other negligence regimes such as strict liability, 
contributory negligence, etc. Nevertheless, these formal models are ideal 
 
 
 45. The owner spent $900,000 of the required $1,000,000 and so performed at ninety percent of 
reasonable care. I am assuming here that the level of exposure to asbestos is inversely related to the 
amount of money spent on abatement. 
 46. The smoker who smokes two packs a day has chosen a level of care equal to 0.5 and so the 
percentage negligence taken is (1 – 0.5) / 1 = 0.5.  
 47. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
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for sharpening our intuitions about the relationship between responsibility 
and liability. 
A. The Standard Model 
I will follow the standard model of accidents in which there is a victim, 
V, and an injurer, I, both of whom can take care to lower the risk of 
accident.48 If x and y are the levels of care taken by V and I, respectively, 
assume that the expected damages due to an accident is given by the 
function D(x,y) > 0, which is decreasing in both variables. Taking care is 
costly, so let cI and cV be the costs per unit care for I and V. Under these 
assumptions, the expected social cost of an accident is 
),(),( yxDycxcyxSC VI ++=  
where cI x and cV y represent the costs to the parties of taking care and 
D(x,y) is the expected cost of an accident. Let x* and y* be the court-
designated thresholds of reasonable care. It would be typical to assume 
that the pair (x*,y*) is also the socially optimum point, i.e., where the 
social cost is minimized, but I need not make that assumption for what 
follows. It is important to note that this choice of levels of reasonable care 
entails the expectation of some accidents. This is because care is costly, 
and so it is inefficient to try to eliminate all accidents. 
Suppose that, for whatever reason, the parties exercise less than the 
reasonable care. Due to miscalculation, incompetence, willfulness, or 
some other reason, the parties choose x′ and y′ as their levels of care, 
where x′ < x* and y′ < y*. Since both parties have chosen to exercise less-
than-reasonable care, they would both be found negligent were an accident 
to occur. Let Δx = x* – x′ and Δy = y* – y′. 
What is the appropriate way to compute the “percentage of combined 
negligence attributable”49 to each party? There are two natural ways to 
proceed, and both will play a role in the subsequent analysis. The first is to 
say that the total amount of negligence in the situation is given by Δx + 
Δy, and so the percentage of that negligence attributable to V is Δx / Δx + 
Δy and that attributable to I is given by Δy / Δx + Δy. That is to say, the 
negligence of each party is measured as the absolute difference between 
the level of care taken and the level of due care where the total amount of 
negligence is the sum of the negligence of each party. I will call this the 
percentage of absolute negligence. 
 
 
 48. See SHAVELL, supra note 27, at 183; see also Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1102. 
 49. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 17.04[c], at 370 (Question No. 5). 
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There is another way to approach this problem, however. Suppose we 
measure the amount of negligence of a party as the percentage shortfall in 
the amount of care taken from the level of reasonable care, i.e., the 
negligence attributable to V is Δx/x*, and that attributable to I is Δy/y*. If 
we calculate negligence in this fashion then the total amount of negligence 
is 
**
**
** yx
xyyx
y
y
x
x Δ+Δ=Δ+Δ , 
the percentage of negligence attributable to V is 
xyyx
xy
yx
xyyx
x
x
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ+Δ
Δ
**
*
**
**
* , 
and the percentage of negligence attributable to I is 
xyyx
yx
yx
xyyx
y
y
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ+Δ
Δ
**
*
**
**
* . 
I will call this the percentage of relative negligence. 
To distinguish between these two methods of assigning negligence, I 
will examine what incentives they give to the parties to take care. The 
apportionment of negligence is used to apportion the damages. To provide 
the appropriate incentives to the parties, the apportionment of damages 
should represent the percentage of the expected damages for which each 
party is responsible. Given that there is expected damage for which no one 
is liable, it makes sense to assign damages according to the amount 
generated over and above the baseline acceptable amount. By our 
assumption, the parties are exercising levels of care of x′ and y′, and so the 
expected increase in damages produced by that choice is 
DyxDyxD Δ=− *)*,()','(  
which we can approximate by 
yyx
y
Dxyx
x
DD Δ∂
∂−Δ∂
∂−≈Δ *)*,(*)*,( .50  (1) 
 
 
 50. This is the differential approximation from several-variable calculus. See supra note 32. The 
negative signs are because I have chosen the ∆’s to be positive, and the partial derivatives are negative 
by assumption. 
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The first term in the sum represents the contribution of V to the increase in 
damages, and the second term is the contribution of I to the increase. Note 
that this approximation is good if ∆x and ∆y are small. If there is a large 
deviation from the standard of reasonable care, i.e., if the ∆’s are large, 
then this approximation does not apply. On the other hand, if the deviation 
from reasonable care is large, then perhaps the standards of gross 
negligence apply, and thus punitive damages can be assigned to correct for 
the errors introduced. 
In order to proceed further, I will need to identify two paradigmatic 
situations. The first is one in which the levels of care are commensurate, 
what I will call additive care. The other is one in which the levels of care 
are incommensurate. This I will call multiplicative care. In order to make 
this precise, I will have to restrict my attention to two special choices for 
the function D(x,y). 
B. Additive Care 
In the case of additive care, I will assume that the function D(x,y) is of 
the form 
)(),( yxqyxD += , 
where q > 0, and q′ < 0. This assumption is saying that the levels of care of 
V and I are commensurable, i.e., they make sense to add together and the 
probability of an accident is a function of the sum of the levels of care. 
Under this assumption Equation (1) becomes 
yyxqxyxqD Δ+−Δ+−≈Δ *)*('*)*(' . 
The percentage of the new damages attributable to V is 
yx
x
yyxqxyxq
xyxq
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ+−Δ+−
Δ+−
*)*('*)*('
*)*(' . 
Similarly, the percentage of damages attributable to I, is 
yx
y
Δ+Δ
Δ . 
These percentages are exactly the percentages of absolute negligence.  
Proposition 1: In the case of additive care, using the percentage of 
absolute negligence results in an apportionment of damages according to 
the percentage of expected damages that each party generated. 
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C. Multiplicative Care 
In the case of multiplicative care, I will assume that the function D(x,y) 
is of the form 
)(),( xypyxD = , 
assuming again that p > 0, and p′ < 0. This assumption amounts to saying 
that the levels of care of V and I are incommensurable, and so the 
appropriate units for measurement of care overall is the product of the two 
types of care. 
Under the multiplicative care assumption, Equation (1) becomes 
yxyxpxyyxpD Δ−Δ−≈Δ **)*('**)*(' . 
The percentage of the new damages attributable to V is 
yxxy
xy
yxyxpxyyxp
xyyxp
Δ+Δ
Δ=Δ−Δ−
Δ−
**
*
**)*('**)*('
**)*(' . 
Similarly the percentage of damages attributable to I is 
yxxy
yx
Δ+Δ
Δ
**
* . 
These percentages are exactly each party’s percentage of relative 
negligence. 
Proposition 2: In the case of multiplicative care, using the percentage 
of relative negligence results in an apportionment of damages according to 
the percentage of expected damages that each party generated. 
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